

Data-driven distributed optimization, markets, and control for an IBR-rich grid edge

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
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Grid edge becoming more complex, intelligent, capable



A distributed paradigm

Urban distribution network: ~2 million nodes [1]



At grid's edge

Intelligence + Control



119m smart meters in 2022 [2]

Communication



Internet of things

Renewables



Projected 6.7 GW solar in
New England by 2028 [3]

Faster Timescales



Solar + Wind
Demand Response
milliseconds - minutes

- Resource Coordination: Distributed Optimization + Control
- Multiple stakeholders are present

[1] M. Zhao et al. Trans. on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, Feb. 2002

[2] EIA


[3] ISO-NE <https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/in-depth/solar-power-in-new-england-locations-and-impact>.

Transactive Energy


Use markets & prices to influence desired behaviours from various **autonomous, independent agents at the grid edge, at fast timescales**

Efficient integration of Distributed Energy Resources possible with a transactive design:


- **Flexible loads** (thermostats, water heaters)
- Distributed generation (rooftop **solar, wind**)
- Storage (**EVs, batteries**)



Primer on electricity markets



Why local retail electricity markets?



Gaps in Existing Programs



- Retail and wholesale differ
- Prohibitive costs for small resources
- Limiting participation requirements [1]
- Retail markets do not exist
- Fixed retail prices are inefficient
- Over- or under-compensation [2,3]



Vary spatially + temporally



Fully integrate DERs into the network
using **distributed & decentralized** local retail markets

[1] J. Gundlach and R. Webb. "Distributed energy resource participation in wholesale markets: Lessons from the California ISO", 2018

[2] Newell, S and Ahmad Fi "Dynamic Pricing: Potential Wholesale Market Benefits in New York" *The Brattle Group* (2009).

[3] L.V. Wood. "Why net energy metering results in a subsidy: The elephant in the room." 2016

Hierarchical local electricity markets (LEM)



Secondary market (SM)

$$\min_{\vec{s}_j} \sum_j \left(w_1 \left(\beta_j^P (P_j - P_j^0)^2 + \beta_j^Q (Q_j - Q_j^0)^2 \right) + w_2 (\mu_j^P P_j + \mu_j^Q Q_j) - w_3 (\delta P_j + \delta Q_j) - w_4 \boxed{RS_j(t)} \left((P_j)^2 + (Q_j)^2 \right) \right)$$

Resilience score


Min: disutility to SMA_j

Min: net cost to SMO

Max: aggregate flexibility & reliability

Subject to:

- Device operating and flexibility limits (P and Q limits)
- Budget balance
- Price cap for retail prices
- Lossless power balance
- Multi-objective optimization via hierarchical approach
- Can also extend this to multiple phases



- **IoT trustability score (TS):**
Captures possibly of agents being compromised. Based on IoT network traffic patterns & cyber anomalies or vulnerabilities
- **Commitment score (CS):**
Measures how reliably agents will follow through & meet their contractual commitments
- **Resilience score (RS)** combines both to provide overall situational awareness

$$RS_j = CS_j + (1 - \alpha)TS_j, 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$$

$$0 \leq RS \leq 1 \text{ (RS closer to 1 = more resilient)}$$

Primary market: AC optimal power flow

- Branch flow (DistFlow) model
- Balanced, single-phase, radial network
- 2nd order cone convex relaxation

$$\min f(x)$$

Subject to:

$$v_j - v_i = (R_{ij}^2 + X_{ij}^2)l_{ij} - 2(R_{ij}P_{ij} + X_{ij}Q_{ij})$$

$$P_{ij} = R_{ij}l_{ij} - P_j + \sum_{k \in \{k_j\}} P_{jk}$$

$$Q_{ij} = X_{ij}l_{ij} - Q_j + \sum_{k \in \{k_j\}} Q_{jk}$$

$$P_{ij}^2 + Q_{ij}^2 \leq v_i l_{ij}$$

$$P_j \in [P_j, \overline{P_j}], Q_j \in [Q_j, \overline{Q_j}]$$

$$v_j \in [v_j, \overline{v_j}]$$

where $l_{ij} = |I_{ij}|^2$ and $v_i = |V_i|^2$.

- Current injection model
- Unbalanced, 3-phase, radial/meshed network
- McCormick envelopes convex relaxation

$$\min_x f(x)$$

$$I^R = \text{Re}(YV)$$

$$I^I = \text{Im}(YV)$$

$$P_i^\phi = V_i^{\phi,R} I_i^{\phi,R} + V_i^{\phi,I} I_i^{\phi,I} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P}$$


$$Q_i^\phi = -V_i^{\phi,R} I_i^{\phi,I} + V_i^{\phi,I} I_i^{\phi,R} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P}$$

$$\underline{V_i^\phi}^2 \leq (V_i^{\phi,R})^2 + (V_i^{\phi,I})^2 \leq \overline{V_i^\phi}^2 \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P}$$


$$P_i^\phi \leq P_i^\phi \leq \overline{P_i^\phi} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P}$$

$$Q_i^\phi \leq Q_i^\phi \leq \overline{Q_i^\phi} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P}$$

$$(I_{ij}^R)^2 + (I_{ij}^I)^2 \leq \overline{I_{ij}}^2 \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{N}, \phi \in \mathcal{P}$$



Distributed optimization: Proximal atomic coordination (PAC)



Lagrangian

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}(a, \eta, \nu) &= \sum_{j \in K} [f_j(a_j) + \eta_j^T (G_j a_j - b_j) + \nu^T B^j a_j] \\ &\triangleq \sum_{j \in K} \mathcal{L}_j(a_j, \eta_j, \nu) \end{aligned}$$


$$a_j[\tau + 1] = \underset{a_j}{\operatorname{argmin}} \left\{ \mathcal{L}_j(a_j, \hat{\mu}_j[\tau], \hat{\nu}[\tau]) + \frac{1}{2\rho} \|a_j - a_j[\tau]\|_2^2 \right\}$$

$$\mu_j[\tau + 1] = \mu_j[\tau] + \rho \gamma_j \tilde{G}_j a_j[\tau + 1] \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\mu}_j[\tau + 1] = \mu_j[\tau + 1] + \rho \hat{\gamma}_j[\tau + 1] \tilde{G}_j a_j[\tau + 1]$$


Communicate $\{a_j[\tau + 1]\}$ with neighbours, for all j

$$\nu_j[\tau + 1] = \nu_j[\tau] + \rho \gamma_j [B]_j a[\tau + 1] \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\nu}_j[\tau + 1] = \nu_j[\tau + 1] + \rho \hat{\gamma}_j[\tau + 1] [B]_j a[\tau + 1]$$


Communicate $\{\hat{\nu}_j[\tau + 1]\}$ with neighbours, for all j




Primary retail market clearing using SMO bids & PAC



- Fully distributed
- Computationally tractable
- Reduced communication requirements
- Preserve data privacy (for dual variables)



LEM summary




Hierarchical paradigm:
Accommodate concerns for market stakeholders and grid operators at all levels of the grid

Power physics and distribution-level constraints (Distributed optimization)

Commitment reliability, utility, flexibility & budget constraints (Decentralized optimization)

Prosumer preferences & end-user privacy (Game theory)


LEM provides situational awareness at both primary & secondary feeder levels




*Haider et al., TSG 2021; Nair et al., TSG 2022; Nair et al., CCTA 2023; Nair et al., ICCPS 2024.

Example secondary market results


SMA bids into SM at node 7




SMA schedules from SMO 7



Local retail tariffs




Net active power injection schedules & responses for SMO 17



Use SMAs' actual responses to
update commitment scores





Commitment score of each DCA over time




Retail prices across PM and SM

- PM and SM provide granular spatially and temporally varying prices
- Average dLMP across network better reflects real-time operational flexibility with SMO
→ Lower overall costs






[\$/kWh]	Hierarchical LEM	Primary LEM only	No LEM
Avg. dLMP	0.064	0.116	N/A
Avg. local tariff	0.082	0.116	0.129 [1]

LEM for voltage regulation



LEM (SM + PM) improves overall voltage profile → More uniform + closer to 1 p.u.

LEM enables accurate grid service pricing



“Bundled” tariff

$$\lambda_{eq} = (\lambda_P^* P^* + \lambda_Q^* Q^* + \bar{\lambda}_V^* \Delta V^*) / P^*$$

$$\Delta V^* = |V^{R^*} - 1| + |V^{I^*}|$$

Distributed model predictive voltage control

- Primary control with passive grid circuit dynamics

$$\begin{bmatrix} L & 0 \\ 0 & C \end{bmatrix} \frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} i(t) \\ V(t) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -Z & B^\top \\ -\bar{G}B & -\bar{G}Y_{\text{load}} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} i(t) \\ V(t) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ -CK_q \Delta q(t) \end{bmatrix}$$

- Derive coupled cluster dynamics
- Define DMPC optimization problem
- Bring distributed optimization into standard separable form for solver



$$\min_{U_c(k) \in \mathcal{U}_c} \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} f_c(U_c(k))$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \mathcal{A}_c U_c(k) = d$$

$$\mathbf{x}_c(\ell + 1) = \mathbf{A}_c \mathbf{x}_c(\ell) + \mathbf{M}_c \mathbf{u}_c(\ell) + \mathbf{c}_c \forall \ell, \forall c \in \mathcal{C},$$


$$\tilde{\mathbf{v}}_{c_i}^{\text{con}}(\ell) = \tilde{\mathbf{B}}_{c_j, c_i}^{\text{con}} \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{c_j}(\ell), \quad \forall (c_i, c_j) \in \mathcal{E}_c, \quad \forall \ell,$$

$$\tilde{\mathbf{v}}_{c_j}^{\text{con}}(\ell) = \tilde{\mathbf{B}}_{c_i, c_j}^{\text{con}} \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{c_i}(\ell), \quad \forall (c_i, c_j) \in \mathcal{E}_c, \quad \forall \ell,$$






Cluster dynamics
Consensus constraints for voltage copies

- Solve using algorithm based on alternating direction method of multipliers [1]






DMPC outperforms averaging PI control


PI



DMPC



- Simulate large load step disturbance
- Stable response without parameter tuning
- Reduces oscillations
- Relies more on IBRs closer to load step
- More efficient dispatch → Lower losses



Conclusions

- Hierarchical local electricity markets allowing handling of grid constraints & agent preferences @ different levels
 - Improve grid reliability & avoid 'tier-bypassing' issues
 - Provide grid services like flexibility & voltage control
 - Spatial-temporal prices → Accurately charge/compensate prosumers
- Markets can be used to implement distributed optimization & control algorithms
- Questions for discussion:
 - How can we extend our methods to cases with limited observability?
 - How can we use our algorithms for reforming electricity markets & policy?
 - How do we redesign utility business models for IBR-rich grids?
 - How do we redistribute costs & ensure fair tariffs?

Enhanced version: NST-PAC

$$\begin{aligned} a_j[\tau + 1] = \underset{a_j}{\operatorname{argmin}} \{ & \mathcal{L}_j(a_j, \hat{\eta}_j[\tau], \hat{\nu}[\tau]) \\ & + \frac{\rho_j \gamma_j}{2} \|G_j a_j - b_j\|_2^2 + \frac{\rho_j \gamma_j}{2} \|B_j a_j\|_2^2 \\ & + \frac{1}{2\rho_j} \|a_j - a_j[\tau]\|_2^2 \} \end{aligned}$$

$$\hat{a}_j[\tau + 1] = a_j[\tau + 1] + \alpha_j[\tau + 1] (a_j[\tau + 1] - a_j[\tau])$$

$$\eta_j[\tau + 1] = \hat{\eta}_j[\tau] + \rho_j \gamma_j (G_j \hat{a}_j[\tau + 1] - b_j)$$

$$\hat{\eta}_j[\tau + 1] = \eta_j[\tau + 1] + \phi_j[\tau + 1] (\eta_j[\tau + 1] - \eta_j[\tau])$$

Communicate $\hat{a}_j$ for all $j \in [K]$ with neighbors

$$\nu_j[\tau + 1] = \hat{\nu}_j[\tau] + \rho_j \gamma_j B_j \hat{a}_j[\tau + 1]$$

$$\hat{\nu}_j[\tau + 1] = \nu_j[\tau + 1] + \theta_j[\tau + 1] (\nu_j[\tau + 1] - \nu_j[\tau])$$

Communicate $\hat{\nu}_j$ for all $j \in [K]$ with neighbors

- Use nonlinear regularization terms instead of linearized (PAC)
- Both primal & dual variable updates use Nesterov acceleration
- Privacy for both primals/duals
 - Use time-varying & atom-specific step-sizes